Dulat’s ‘The Chief Minister And The Spy’ is very disturbing

Dulat’s book: Disturbing revelations that are astounding and dumbfounding

Former Special Director, Intelligence Bureau (IB), and Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) chief, Amarjit Singh Dulat’s latest book “The Chief Minister And The Spy” was released on April 18, 2025, at India International Centre (IIC), New Delhi. I read it thrice word by word, line by line, to understand what he actually worked for and vouched for, and continues to work for and vouch for. The book is very disturbing. Some of the revelations, which he made in his book, are also highly disturbing, astounding, and dumbfounding. Equally disturbing and astounding is his attitude towards the Indian State vis-à-vis J&K; National Conference (NC) and Farooq Abdullah; greater autonomy/pre-1953 politico-constitutional status; Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi, P V Narasimha Rao and Deve Gowda; Governor of J&K, Jagmohan; Army’s presence in J&K; the People’s Alliance for Gupkar Declaration (PAGD); Article 370 and Article 35A; and Jammu province. No less disturbing and dumbfounding is the revelation that he made about the attitude of Cabinet Secretary Surender Singh, the Union Home Secretary K Padmanabhaiah, and IB Director Arun Bhagat towards J&K and the subversive autonomy line. The revelation about what he called the “compromise” under which the Unified Command was renamed as Unified Headquarters is also no less disturbing and astounding.

What he said and revealed in his book are disturbing all the more because he didn’t appreciate those at the helm who didn’t toe his line, or who were reluctant to throw in the lot of J&K with Farooq Abdullah, whom he called “Kashmir”, like Dev Kant Barooh used to say, “Indira is India, India is Indira.” What he said and revealed in his book are all the more disturbing because he appreciated only those who vouched for what he himself calls “Dulat Doctrine”, or those who endorsed his pro-NC, pro-Farooq Abdullah, and pro-greater autonomy line and views.

As a student of history and a man on the spot in the terrorist and separatist-infested J&K, I considered it my duty to reflect on his book and, hence, this essay.

Kashmir, IB, and Delhi

Dulat, who joined his post in J&K in May 1988 (P. 7), served as Joint Director in the IB from 1988 to 1990. Subsequently, he was promoted to the rank of Special Director. In 1999, he became chief of the R&AW. He also served Prime Minister A B Vajpayee as special advisor on J&K. And, this, notwithstanding the fact that he had rang up the then NC MP, Saif-ud-Din Soz, to congratulate him as he had brought down the 13-day-old Vajpayee government by violating the party’s whip and voting against it. He visited Srinagar for the first time in November 1987. He was on a recce. He was then posted at Bhopal, and MK Narayanan, who also served as National Security Advisor (NSA) during Manmohan Singh’s era, was the IB Director – Narayanan wanted Dulat to keep Farooq Abdullah in a “good humour.” He also met Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah for the first time in November 1987. KP Singh, whom Dulat succeeded, introduced him to Farooq Abdullah at the tea party. At the end of the party, Farooq Abdullah said a few “flattering words about KP” and presented him with a carpet. (PP. 3-5)

Reflecting on the role of the IB in Kashmir and New Delhi’s approach, he, among other things, has said: “In Kashmir, IB plays a much greater role than in any other state, out of necessity. The IB’s presence is almost all-pervading, and every Kashmiri citizen and leader knows that they have 29 Gupkar Road (the Station Chief’s office plus residence) to contend with in all spheres of life. The IB headquarters in New Delhi should have taken advantage of this fact. But over the years, we have had IB chiefs who have been too straight-laced. As a result, Delhi has seen things only in black and white. Now, this doesn’t work in difficult areas like the northeast, Punjab, or Kashmir. Kashmir, in particular, is mostly a grey area — a state constantly in need of empathy, compassion, and compromise (PP. 12-13). You have to talk if you want the separatists in the Hurriyat to enter formal talks with the government. You had to talk to Farooq Abdullah himself in order to keep the Abdullahs relevant to India’s political process. For us in the IB, it has ever been the nature of the beast (P. 13). At no point during my entire association with him has Farooq Abdullah ever been anything but two steps ahead of Delhi’s best games. This is not to say that he is underhanded or manipulative. If anything, Farooq’s integrity and honesty have been his defining characteristics. Farooq was not what Delhi wanted (PP. 13-14)…I knew what Delhi expected of me in Kashmir, but what did the Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah expect? (P. 22)

Golden period of friendship

As for his relations/ friendship with Farooq Abdullah, he, inter alia, has said: “As it turned out, ours would be a relationship that went beyond purely professional (P. 22)…I maintained throughout that there was no one better person suited to handle Kashmir and Kashmiri politics than Farooq Abdullah. I can tell you…I was standing up for my Chief Minister…That winter (1989) had taught me one of the most vital lessons I would learn as a spook: The gun is not a solution. Seeing the violence (of 1989) around me, I had come to the conclusion that if we were going to die by the gun, why didn’t we speak to each other first? That was the most obvious question on my mind as I watched the violence of the winter of 1989-90 come to a head. Since then, I have always felt that engagement is crucial, even if it must be kept secret. It has been the principle of what they call ‘Dulat doctrine’, but what I see as just common sense (P. 32)…Apart from being station head for the IB in Srinagar, I had the new and tacit job of being Farooq Abdullah’s mouthpiece.

Unsurprisingly, this would lend credence to nascent rumours that I am Farooq’s man. I have never had a problem with being termed that. At a time, when the state and the Chief Minister needed support, I was perfectly happy to supply it (P. 37)…Our friendship was always simple and basic as that. There would be many times Farooq Abdullah would drop a careless tip in my lap. Equally, there would be many times where I would be the only person he seemed to listen to, especially when he was in one of his angry moods or when he was pissed off with Delhi…But he was ready to meet, ready to chat, ready to play the kind host. It helped me (P. 119)…There are many who say that Farooq Abdullah is nobody’s friend, that he is selfish and only cares for those who can offer him something beneficial. I don’t agree with that – I have seen Farooq being a friend to those he really didn’t have any investment in; he is not a fair-weather man” (PP. 163-164).

Dulat has further said without mincing words that he not only strove to the hilt to “come up to the expectations of Farooq Abdullah,” when he was Chief Minister (1987-January 1990), but also persuaded him to return to Kashmir from the UK and participate in the 1996 Lok Sabha elections and Assembly elections. So much so, he met him in London in 1993 to know what he actually wanted from New Delhi, or from the Narasimha Rao government. Farooq Abdullah had fled to the UK to escape the militants’ ire. Their grouse against him was that he and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had rigged the 1987 Assembly elections to recapture power.

Dulat has, among other things, also said: “My friendship with Farooq Abdullah helped me lay the foundation for Farooq’s return to Kashmir, which was on his mind as well. Narasimha Rao did not like Farooq too much, and he felt that Kashmir needed a fresh start. (PP. 119-120)…We, both Dulat and Farooq, believed more in the power of dialogue than in the zap of a bullet. I might have gotten the hell out of these, but somehow Kashmir had not let go of me. I was still thinking about it, still thinking about ways to get Farooq back in the driver’s seat…Farooq was the one leader that Kashmir needed…Luckily for me, in those days the IB was helmed by a man who believed in the same things as I did. I liked DIB (Director Intelligence Bureau) R P Joshi (P-109)…But since he (Farooq) was away in London, the best I could do was to begin laying some kind of foundation based on which he might be induced to return to the Valley (P. 112)…The reality was that we had no option other than Farooq Abdullah. That’s when I began devoting most of my time to him. In January 1993, P V Narasimha Rao carved out a separate Department of Kashmir Affairs, which he himself headed (P. 115). I frankly felt Narasimha Rao was a canny fellow. He was not too impressed with the IB or the work that it did, and if there was one thing that I found irritating, it was the idea that he knew it all – anything the IB had to tell him was nothing new” (P. 116).

However, “Now, the process of engaging with Kashmiris has gained momentum. Farooq had come back into the picture. Of this, I had always been convinced, but my efforts became pronounced now. In September 1993, I was in London to attend an intelligence-liaison conference. I had three rights, so I thought I should call on Farooq Abdullah, who was in England those days (PP. 117-118)…As for Farooq Abdullah, he was leaning on my advice for even the formation of his Cabinet at the time (October 1996). My job has transitioned in a manner of speaking – I was not keeping eye on him for Delhi, but I was also his confidant, his comforter in times of need (P. 156). Even for trivial matters like press interviews, he relied on me. I was his main man” (P. 158).

Dulat has further revealed that Farooq Abdullah’s NC would surely have contested the 1996 Lok Sabha elections, had New Delhi appreciated his demand seeking a politico-constitutional status as it existed in 1952. However, the NC did contest the Assembly elections only after he was assured by PM H D Deve Gowda that the issue of autonomy will be discussed with him after the Assembly elections. The NC won 57 seats, and he took over as J&K Chief Minister for the third time. The jubilant Dulat has said: “When Farooq came back to Kashmir as Chief Minister”, “it was the golden period of our friendship” (P. 134).

Indira Gandhi Brahmanical, pro-Hindu,

As said, Dulat didn’t appreciate those who didn’t extend unflinching and unqualified support to Farooq Abdullah and his NC. Take, for example, his views on PM Indira Gandhi: He has said: “Delhi’s only agenda was to paint him (Farooq) as anti-nationalist, pro-Khalistan and pro-Pakistan, to buttress the case for his dismissal (by Jagmohan in 1984). The Congress calls itself a secular organization, but there have always been people in the party who thought communally. Post-1980, Mrs Indira Gandhi had become Brahmanical and pro-Hindu, thanks to the coterie around her” (PP. 94-95).

Hatred for Jagmohan

If Dulat denounced what he called Indira Gandhi’s “Brahmanical and pro-Hindu” approach, he didn’t appreciate the approach of Jagmohan as well. In fact, he hated Jagmohan. So much so, he congratulated Farooq Abdullah for quitting the office of Chief Minister on January 19, 1990, to lodge his protest against the appointment of Jagmohan as J&K Governor.

What has Dulat said about Jagmohan and the nature of his administration in J&K? He has, inter alia, said: “Jagmohan came to Kashmir as Governor on January 19, 1990…I was in Srinagar. Joginder Singh was IGP of the CRPF. Jagmohan gave him hell…Worried, I rang up Jagmohan. But the matters between us had reached a point where he no longer liked being told what to do…Farooq Resigned. He didn’t like Jagmohan. As soon as he resigned, I rang him up to congratulate him… ‘I think you’ve done the right thing,’ I told him. ‘We’ve been proven right. We’ve been warning Delhi umpteen times.’ Now that Farooq Abdullah had resigned, I knew my time was coming. But more to the point, the IB headquarters, at the point in time, was at its weakest. It was the triumvirate of Jagmohan (MoS Home), Arun Nehru, and (Home Minister) Mufti Sayeed whose decisions were the real orders. They wanted me out…So, given what I knew of him, working with Jagmohan now, in the fraught early days of the 1990s, entailed a decent formality. I would call on him as was my duty. He expected certain things from me. For instance, I was expected to call on him on a weekly or fortnightly basis. I was also expected to provide detailed notes for him. Now, I was happy to meet him whenever he called on me…But I refused point-blank to give him any notes…‘These are notes for the IB, Sir,’ I told him honestly at one point…You see, Jagmohan thought that he was the lord and master of Kashmir, and that is the attitude he brought to all his interactions with me – and the IB. It was this attitude that gave him a way in the end, as far as his agenda towards my future in Kashmir was concerned. As Governor, Jagmohan would send detailed reports to Delhi on the situation in Kashmir. In many of these reports, he stressed the urgency of getting me out of Kashmir as fast as possible, and suggested that KP Singh (his predecessor in J&K) be brought back as my replacement…And so it was that I had the unmatched pleasure of knowing exactly what the Governor of Kashmir thought about me in my final days in Srinagar in 1990. This was also the moment that I stopped giving a demn. I stopped going to his meetings. I sent my number two instead…On March 6, 1990, I got a call from Delhi. RC Mehta was coming to Srinagar from Ahmedabad, I was told. Please receive him at the airport…I called up Farooq Abdullah as soon as I hung up on Delhi. ‘Hamara ek officer aa raha hai (an officer from the IB is coming out),’ I said without a preamble. ‘I thought I’d bring him across a cup of tea.’ ‘Kyun aa raha hai? He demanded finally. (Why is he coming?) ‘Meri chhutti ho rahi hai,’ I said amiably. (I’m being transferred.)…We (I and Farooq) talked about a lot of things, and it was under his first tenure as Governor of J&K that the authority of the Centre was indelibly stamped on Kashmir (p. 79).

To make his point, Dulat also quoted in his book what Farooq Abdullah had once said about Jagmohan. Farooq Abdullah had said: “Jagmohan’s earlier tenure cannot be forgotten for the way defined powers under Article 370 were encroached upon…whereby sovereign powers of the legislature of the state were curtailed on vital matters…He behaved like a colonial ruler. He sought his social base from communal outfits (read RSS and BJP) which ultimately resulted in the growth and spread of communal politics, unheard of in our state” (P. 46). Dulat has further quoted what Farooq Abdullah told him. Farooq Abdullah had said: “Farooq Abdullah is like a raincoat – rain falls on it and runs off and doesn’t stick to it. (P. 180)

Besides, Dulat has further said: “Jagmohan, in his time in Kashmir, had gone after those he suspected of funding militancy in the Valley. One of them was Soz’s friend, a prominent businessman, who will remain anonymous, and he was one of those who were funding militancy” (P. 105). It appears that Dulat was also not happy with Jagmohan’s approach towards those funding anti-state operatives.

Blessing in disguise

After the fall of V P Singh’s government, Chandra Shekhar became the new Prime Minister with the support of the Congress party. One of his first actions was to bring MK Narayanan back as the Director of the IB. It turned out to be a blessing in disguise for Dulat. “As soon as that change was effected, Narayanan called for me. ‘You’ve had enough of a holiday,’ he told me. Now come back and do some serious work. I want you to come back and look after Kashmir again.’ That was how I returned, metaphorically speaking, to Kashmir…I never left it again. In December 1990, I was put in charge of the IB’s Kashmir’s Operation Group, known as the K-Group,” Dulat has written in this regard (P. 111).

Canny Narasimha Rao

Dulat didn’t appreciate or like PM P V Narasimha Rao. In this regard, he has, among other things, said: “It was in November 1995 that the IB Director sent me off to brief Narasimha Rao on Kashmir. It was the first time I had ever met the Prime Minister…He asked me, ‘How necessary is Farooq for the revival of the democratic process in Kashmir?’ I was frank. No separatist, Shabir (Shah) included…I insisted that Farooq Abdullah be given a strong chance. After all, the National Conference was now back in the picture, pressuring Delhi to give it something that it could sell to its electorate during the upcoming elections. There were critics of Farooq Abdullah’s mindset and strategy, of course. Rao’s aide and advisor, S Narendra, for instance, has argued in a 2003 book that the NC was ‘blackmailing’ the centre, since its participation in the poll was essential in view of the separatist parties’ call for a poll boycott…Farooq candidly told me, ‘kuch toh dena hoga.’ (You have to give me something…’ (P. 120). Rao’s Prime Ministership was a period that marked Delhi’s attempts to rehaul its policy in Kashmir. That translated into a tense period of waiting for me and Farooq Abdullah. I had to ensure that Farooq stayed in the game, that he didn’t run out of hope or steam or optimism to rejoin the political race in the Valley. Much of this involved dialogue and more dialogue, of course. Farooq Abdullah was now back in the country, tempted by the thought of power” (P. 121).

Dulat didn’t like Narasimha Rao despite his Burkina Faso “sky is the limit” statement. The reason was that he virtually considered this statement hollow in the sense that Narasimha Rao was unwilling to hold negotiations with Farooq Abdullah on the issue of greater autonomy.

What did Narasimha Rao say in Burkina Faso? And, what has Dulat written about all this? He has written thus: “On a visit to the African nation of Burkina Faso, Narasimha Rao made the statement that has gone down in history. The government was willing to discuss any kind of political arrangement with Kashmir, any quantum of azaadi. ‘In a pre-election gesture, Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao today offered a political package to J&K on the use (of) the title of Wazir-e-Azam for the Chief Minister and Sadar-e-Riyasat for the Governor of the state legislature so desired,’ The Hindustan Times reported from Ouagadougou on November 4, 1995. Mr Rao assured the people that Article 370 shall not be abrogated. The Prime Minister went a step further. ‘The sky is the limit,’ were his famous words (P. 130). It defined much of what would come next, but by the end of November 1995, all seemed to be in jeopardy. The NC had backed out of the LS elections. ‘The only reason why we have backed out is that the package of autonomy that we had asked for has not come forth,’ Farooq told India Today. He wanted Kashmir’s status to be restored to what it had been in 1952…I told him that the Prime Minister had said what Farooq Abdullah wanted. Farooq said, ‘Kehne se kya hota hai? (What do words mean?) We want a conversation on the matter with us. Upar hawa mein baton karne se kya fayda? (What is the point of merely saying something?”) (P. 131).

Dulat has further said: “Farooq was adamant – the people’s honour and aspirations for autonomy had to be respected. The then Governor, Gen KV Krishna Rao, wrote in his book, ‘I met Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao on March 25 and he was keen that the NC first participate in the elections and the autonomy issue could be resolved after the elections.’ But obviously, Farooq Abdullah did not want to move ahead without some resolution on the issue. Kuch toh dena hoga.” (They have to give us something concrete.) (p. 133).

“This, then, was the run-up to the 1996 (Assembly) elections, and it formed yet another context in which the friendship between Farooq Abdullah and me began to deepen. The assembly elections would be a milestone for Kashmir, a milestone for Farooq Abdullah. ‘We never asked for azaadi but for rights to be returned. It’s on that promise that I went to the polls and carried people with me…’ When Farooq Abdullah came back to Kashmir as Chief Minister, it was almost as though it was the start of a new era in Jammu and Kashmir. For Farooq Abdullah and me, it was the beginning of a new era, certainly (P. 134)…And, Delhi certainly didn’t mind whatever I did. It was not often that the MHA (Ministry of Home Affairs) and the IB were on the same page, but in the days before the 1996 elections, this was the case (P. 136)…It helped that Delhi (and I) had been making the right noises about granting ‘peace with honour’ to Kashmir (P. 144)…Farooq is Kashmir” (P. 145), Dulat has further written.

Fall of Gowda: A lost opportunity

Unlike Indira Gandhi and Narasimha Rao, Dulat liked PM H D Deve Gowda very much. He considered him reasonable, rational, and also amenable. Why? Let’s read what he has said about himself. He has, inter alia, said: “After consulting his astrologer, Prime Minister Deve Gowda fixed his official date for his visit as 6 July 1996. (P. 147). Gowda favoured autonomy. Narasimha Rao never accepted our views on Autonomy, but Deve Gowda believes in making India a federal country (PP. 148-149)…On August 2, 1996, Deve Gowda had ended his speech in Parliament, saying, ‘I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate the government’s commitment to give maximum autonomy to the state. Once an elected government is in place, we would hold consultations with them to arrive at a consensus’ (P. 151)…In June 1996, the assurance of ‘maximum autonomy’ generated hope and discussion in the Valley. Gowda himself recalled: ‘I remember the Hurriyat leaders were stubborn. They said let the Centre keep railways, highways, currency, defence, foreign affairs, and let us manage the rest. I never discussed Article 370. I discussed only autonomy. I did five rounds of talks, but did not give any publicity. My strategy was to solve it like I had solved the Idgah Maidan issue in Hubli: quietly…One of my conditions to the Hurriyat was you should not discuss anything with the media, and I too will not speak to them’ (PP. 151-152)…The promise by the United Front (UF) government that it will give ‘maximum autonomy’ to Kashmir is being widely seen as a positive signal that could end strife in the Valley and restore peace: Outlook, June 19, 1996” (P. 152)

Compromise

What Dulat has said and revealed about Deve Gowda and his approach towards the autonomy issue is as disturbing as it is dumbfounding. But what is all the more disturbing and dumbfounding is what he further said: “The fall of the Deve Gowda government was a lost opportunity to build a real bridge between Delhi and Srinagar. Most importantly, given the international and national context reigning at the time, it would have been a good chance for Delhi to reduce the superfluous army presence in the Valley (PP. 162-163)…However, the army did not want to cede the power it wielded as head of the Unified Command and insisted that only it could be in charge; Farooq Abdullah wanted it headed by his DGP (Director General of Police). The compromise was that the name of the set-up was changed to the Unified Headquarters headed by the Chief Minister, who was assisted by the two Corps Commanders deployed in Jammu and Kashmir” (P. 163).

Autonomy network

If Dulat was happy with Deve Gowda and unhappy with the army’s presence in Kashmir, he was very, very happy with the then Cabinet Secretary, the Union Home Secretary, and the IB Director. He has virtually described them as an autonomous network in New Delhi. Let me quote what he has said. He has said: “Before the 1996 (assembly) elections, the Director IB had lost his job, and Arun Bhagat was the new Director. He didn’t know the ABC of the IB at the time, but what happened then was that the Cabinet Secretary Surendra Singh, the Home Secretary K Padmanabhaiah, and the Director IB all got on very well. Surendra Singh was a fine gentleman, and while Padmanabhaiah was haughty, he was one Home Secretary who devoted himself to Kashmir and whose door was always open to Kashmiris. Now, because of my affinity with Farooq Abdullah, I fitted into the whole network (P. 155).

Onslaught on the spiritual, political identity of Kashmir

The reading down of Article 370 and abrogation of Article 35A rattled Dulat like it had rattled, disturbed, and outraged the Kashmiri Muslim leaders, without any exception. He described the abrogation of special status as an onslaught on what he called the spiritual and political identity of Kashmir. He calls it “Kashmiriyat”.

Expressing his anger and disapproval and making a common cause with the protagonists of special status in Kashmir and elsewhere, he has, among other things, said: “Since then (August 5, 2029), I have written and spoken out against abrogation. My point was always – why rip away the fig leaf of dignity that the Kashmiris possess (P. 210)…The Hindu termed the post-abrogation era in Kashmir a ‘new chapter of alienation,’ which is an apt way to put it (P. 217)…Article 370 gave legal and constitutional validity to the accession and sought to define the state’s special status within the Indian Union. This essentially was the political safeguard that the Kashmiri Muslim sought for the protection of Kashmiriyat and his identity (P. 231)…Problems arose subsequently when Kashmiris began to perceive that India was reneging on preserving their special status and defending their unique identity. At a fundamental level, Kashmiri movements since then have not focused as much on leaving India as on defending their spiritual and political identity: Kashmiriyat (P. 231)…One gets the feeling that it was totally uncalled for. It was a bad move because Article 370 was a hollow provision. There was no need to have touched it, for it prevented nothing. Small wonder, then, that Kashmiriyat as it once used to be in the old days stands in danger of extinction today” (P. 232).

Farooq’s detention against humanity

It was not just the abrogation of special status that had irked Dulat; the detention of Farooq Abdullah had also irked and upset him. What has he said and revealed about Farooq Abdullah’s view on the reading down of Article 370 and his detention? Making a revelation that Farooq Abdullah was ready to help the Modi Government to do away with Article 370, he has, among other things, said: “On September 16, New Delhi detained Farooq Abdullah and slapped him with the Public Safety Act, a stringent law under which he could be in jail without trial for six months, extendable up to two years. Not just on humanitarian grounds, but because it highlighted just how grimly determined Delhi was to stamp its authority on the Valley. There was no better symbol of that than jailing Farooq Abdullah. There were many Kashmiri youngsters who were quite happy to see him detained (PP. 206-207)…Farooq Abdullah was terribly hurt. Just as the BJP had never hidden its intentions towards Kashmir as far as Article 370 was concerned, so, too, had Farooq Abdullah been extremely open about his willingness to work with Delhi. Maybe, he said, the NC could have had the proposal passed in the legislative assembly in J&K. ‘We would have helped,’ he told me when I met him in 2020. ‘Why were we not taken into confidence? ’ (P. 208)…‘Kar lo agar karna hai,’ he said, somewhat bitterly. ‘Par yeh arrest kyu karna tha? (Do it if you must, but why arrest us?) (P. 209).

It’s a different story that Farooq Abdullah and Omar Abdullah denounced Dulat for making the revelation that the NC would have worked with the Modi government as far as the abrogation of special status was concerned. Farooq Abdullah was so angry with Dulat that he went back on his commitment that he would participate in the book release function.

Formation of PAGD: A masterstroke

Dulat has also said something about the now almost defunct People’s Alliance for Gupkar Declaration (PAGD), formed on August 4, 2019, a day before the abrogation of special status, and termed it as Farooq Abdullah’s masterstroke. At the same time, however, he is unhappy because Saif-ud-Din Soz is not part of it. In this regard, Dulat has said: “In 2019, it was Farooq who was the main player in bringing political parties together in the form of the PAGD, an electoral alliance between several regional political parties in the state of J&K, with the aim of restoring special status, along with Article 35A, of the state (P. 220)…Doctor Sahib’s (read Farooq Abdullah) forming the PAGD with other political parties of J&K in 2020 (read August 4, 2019) was a master stroke in the aftermath of the abrogation of Article 370 (P. 230)…I decided to call Saif-ud-Din Soz to find out where matters stood. Soz Sahib kya ho raha hai aaj kal? (Soz, sir, what is happening these days?…Kuch nahi ho raha, he replied. Koi poochhta hi nahi hai humko’ (Nothing is happening. Nobody asks me anything.) Aap Doctor Sahib se kyu nahi milte ho? Aap PAGD main kyun nahi ho? (Why don’t you meet Doctor Sahib? Why aren’t you in the PAGD?” (P. 107).

Calling Jammu a Hindu-majority wrong

Dulat also has to say something about the Jammu province. He has said, “Abrogation is one thing. Bifurcation of the state is worse…With the bifurcation, the seeds were sown for communalism to flourish further. Don’t forget that Jammu is not just Hindu, it has a substantial Muslim and Sikh population as well. To dismiss it as just a Hindu-majority region would be wrong” (P. 233). And that’s all he has in his scheme of things about Jammu province and the people it houses.

Carpet dream remained unfulfilled

Dulat had hoped that Farooq Abdullah would also host a tea party and give him a carpet, but it didn’t happen. And Dulat regrets it in his own style. Regretting, he has said: “KP Singh introduced him to Farooq Abdullah at the tea party (in 1987). At the end of the party, Farooq Abdullah said a few flattering words about KP and presented him with a carpet…I remember wondering if this was a signal that I, too, in my time, might get a carpet at my farewell – if I managed to come up to the Chief Minister’s expectations (PP. 3-5)…I remember thinking that, unlike KP, I would not be getting either a carpet or a farewell party! But in the end, I suppose it was all right. In the bargain, I had learnt a great deal about the great man (Farooq Abdullah). I had come to realize, even then, that Doctor Sahib was not just a Chief Minister. He was Kashmir” (PP. 40-51).

How sad? Dulat’s carpet dream remained unfulfilled despite the best efforts which he put in all through to “Come up to Farooq Abdullah’s expectations”.

All this should explain Dulat’s whole attitude, role and approach. It’s hardly necessary to further explain the implications of what he did and said as Director IB and as R&AW chief. I leave it to the readers’ judgment.

Note:
1. Text in Blue points to additional data on the topic.
2. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent or reflect the views of PGurus.

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